第十四章:學者因法律備忘錄被送懲戒
法律分析與論理
註腳
【2】 同上。
【3】 Third Annual Report to the Congress on United States
Foreign Policy, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume I,
Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 103, February 9, 1972, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3736
(last visited May 10, 2016).
【4】 U.S.
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
【5】 Id.
at 319 (“He makes treaties with the advice and
consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation
the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. As
Marshall said in his great argument of March 7, 1800, in the House of
Representatives, "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.”);
Congressional Research Service, The Constitution of United States of America Analysis and
Interpretation, U.S. Congress, 2002, p. 492, http://constitution.org/cons/GPO-CONAN-2002.pdf
(last visited May 10, 2016) (“Negotiation, a Presidential
Monopoly.—Actually, the negotiation of treaties had long since been taken
over by the President; the Senate’s role in relation to treaties is today
essentially legislative in character. “He
alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation, the Senate cannot intrude; and
Congress itself is powerless to invade it,” declared Justice Sutherland for the
Court in 1936. The Senate must,
moreover, content itself with such information as the President chooses to furnish it.”).
【6】 憲法第63條:「立法院有議決法律案、預算案、戒嚴案、大赦案、宣戰案、媾和案、條約案及國家其他重要事項之權。《立法院職權行使法》第十七條:行政院遇有重要事項發生,或施政方針變更時,行政院院長或有關部會首長應向立法院院會提出報告,並備質詢」。
【7】 黃丞儀,註1。
【8】 司法院大法官會議釋字第520號解釋,2001年1月15日。
【9】 黃丞儀,註1。
【10】同上。
【11】同上。
【12】司法院大法官釋字第613號解釋,2006年7月21日。
【13】司法院大法官釋字第585號解釋,2004年12月15日。
【14】司法院大法官釋字第391號解釋,1995年12月8日。
【15】司法院,註12。
【16】History Commons, Profile: William
Howard Taft IV, http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=william_howard_taft_iv
(last visited May 10, 2016) (“William Howard Taft IV, the State Department’s
chief legal adviser, responds to John Yoo’s January 9,2002, memo (see January 9, 2002) saying that Yoo’s analysis
is ‘seriously flawed.’ Taft writes: ‘In previous conflicts, the United
States has dealt with tens of thousands of detainees without repudiating its
obligations under the [Geneva] Conventions. I have no doubt we can do so here,
where a relative handful of persons is involved.’ Applying the Geneva
Conventions, according to Taft, would demonstrate that the United States ‘bases
its conduct on its international legal obligations and the rule of law, not
just on its policy preferences.’ Taft ends with a scorching criticism. ‘Your
position is, at this point, erroneous in its substance and untenable in
practice. Your conclusions are as wrong as they are incomplete. Let’s talk.’”).
【17】The New York Times, A Guide to the
Memos on Torture, http://www.nytimes.com/ref/international/24MEMO-GUIDE.html
(last visited May 10, 2016) (“JAN. 25 Alberto R. Gonzales, the White House counsel, in a memorandum to President
Bush, said that the Justice Department's advice in the Jan. 9
memorandum was sound and that Mr. Bush should declare the Taliban and Al Qaeda
outside the coverage of the Geneva Conventions. That would keep American
officials from being exposed to the federal War Crimes Act, a 1996 law that
carries the death penalty.”).
【18】Id. (“JAN. 26 In a memorandum to the White House, Secretary of State Colin
L. Powell said
the advantages of applying the Geneva Conventions far outweighed their
rejection. He said that declaring the conventions inapplicable would ‘reverse
over a century of U.S. policy and practice in supporting the Geneva Conventions
and undermine the protections of the laws of war for our troops.’ He also said
it would ‘undermine public support among critical allies.’”).
【19】Id. (“FEB. 7 In a directive that set new rules for handling prisoners captured in
Afghanistan, President Bush broadly cited the need for ‘new
thinking in the law of war.’ He ordered that all people detained as part of the
fight against terrorism should be treated humanely even if the United States considered
them not to be protected by the Geneva Conventions, the White House said.
Document released by White House.”).
【20】History commons,
supra note 16, (“Jay
Bybee. The Justice Department’s Office
of Legal Counsel (OLC) sends a non-classified memo to White House Counsel
Alberto Gonzales, offering the opinion that a policy allowing suspected al-Qaeda members to be tortured
abroad ‘may be justified.’ This memo will later be nicknamed the ‘Golden Shield’ by insiders in the hopes that it will protect
government officials from later being charged with war crimes. Multiple Authors-
The 50-page ‘torture memo’ is signed and authored by Jay S. Bybee,
head of OLC, and co-authored by John Yoo, a deputy assistant attorney general.
It is later revealed that Yoo authored the memo himself, in close consultation
with Vice President Cheney’s chief adviser David Addington, and Bybee just signed
off on it. Deputy White House
counsel Timothy Flanigan also contributed to the memo. Addington contributed
the claim that the president may authorize any interrogation method, even if it
is plainly torture. Addington’s reasoning: US and treaty law ‘do not apply’ to the commander in chief, because Congress ‘may no more regulate the president’s
ability to detain and interrogate enemy combatants than it may regulate his
ability to direct troop movements on the battlefield.’”)
【21】Id.
(“Though Goldsmith has the support of his boss, Attorney General John Ashcroft,
Ashcroft’s deputy, James Comey, and his own deputy, Patrick Philbin, he knows
the White House will fight the withdrawal. Goldsmith will decide to issue the
withdrawal and then resign his position, effectively forcing the administration
to either quietly accept the withdrawal, or fight it and make his resignation a
media circus. ‘If the story had come out that the US government decided to
stick by the controversial opinions that led the head of the Office of Legal
Counsel to resign, that would have looked bad,’he later recalls.”); Michael P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams,
Shaping Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis: The Role of International Law and
the State Department Legal Adviser, 193 (Cambridge University Press) (January 2010),
https://books.google.com.tw/books?id=ZaQgAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA193&lpg=PA193&dq=Goldsmith+called+them+%22cursory+and+one-sided+legal+arguments%22&source=bl&ots=KgB1dFe5Cb&sig=OYnJU2ZMcpUC1Rt4QIv0Xf-vE8Y&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi8kdagt87MAhUCFpQKHeGrBQIQ6AEIIDAB#v=onepage&q=Goldsmith%20called%20them%20%22cursory%20and%20one-sided%20legal%20arguments%22&f=false
(last visited May 10, 2016) (“Goldsmith explained that he rescinded the torture
memoranda not because they had reached the wrong conclusions, but rather
because he thought the memoranda ‘rested on cursory and one-sided arguments,’
and were ‘legally flawed tendentious in substance and tone and overbroad and
thus largely unnecessary.’”).
【22】The New York Times, Reaction to
C.I.A. Torture Report, The New York Times, December 09, 2014, http://news.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/09/cia-torture-report/ (last visited May 10, 2016) (“After senior
administration officials gave permission to the C.I.A. to use all previously
approved “enhanced” interrogation techniques except waterboarding, Mr. Ashcroft
sent a one-paragraph memo to the agency stating that it would be lawful to use
those techniques on Mr. Gul. This memo, the report said, simply stated that
conclusion and contained no legal analysis to support its claim.”).
【23】Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Report Faults 2
Authors of Bush’s Terror Memos, The New York Times, February 19, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/20/us/politics/20justice.html
(last visited May 10, 2016) (“ The
ethics lawyers, in the Office of Professional Responsibility, concluded that
two department lawyers involved in analyzing and justifying waterboarding and other interrogation tactics — Jay S. Bybee, now a federal judge, and John C. Yoo, now a professor at the University of California, Berkeley — had demonstrated ‘professional misconduct.’ It said the lawyers had ignored legal precedents and
provided slipshod legal advice to the White House in possible violation of
international and federal laws on torture.”).
【24】Id. (“But David Margolis, a career lawyer at the Justice
Department, rejected that conclusion in a report of his own released Friday. He said the
ethics lawyers, in condemning the lawyers’ actions, had given short shrift to
the national climate of urgency in which Mr. Bybee and Mr. Yoo acted after the
attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. ‘Among the difficulties in assessing these memos now
over seven years after their issuance is that the context is lost,’ Mr.
Margolis said.”).
【25】Id. (“Mr. Margolis said that in
rejecting harsher sanctions, “this decision should not be viewed as an
endorsement of the legal work that underlies those memoranda.” But he said the
legal advice of Mr. Yoo and the other lawyers, while ‘flawed’ and insufficient in some
areas, did not rise to the level of “professional misconduct,” which could have
resulted in bar reviews or other disciplinary action...... ‘While I have declined to
adopt O.P.R.’s findings of misconduct, I fear that John Yoo’s loyalty to his
own ideology and convictions clouded his view of his obligation to his client
and led him to author opinions that reflected his own extreme, albeit sincerely
held, view of executive power while speaking for an institutional client,’ Mr. Margolis said.”).
【26】 Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment
Inside the Bush Administration
165-66 (W. W. Norton Company) (2007)
(“How could this have happened? How could OLC have written
opinions that, when revealed to the world weeks after the Abu Ghraib scandal
broke, made it seem as though the administration was giving official sanction
to torture, and brought such dishonor on the United States, the Bush
administration, the Department of Justice, and the CIA? How could its opinions
reflect such bad judgment, be so poorly reasoned, and have such terrible
tone?...The main explanation is fear [of a new attack]. Fear explains why OLC
pushed the envelope. And in pushing the envelope, OLC took shortcuts in its
opinion-writing procedures.”).
【27】The Lectric Law Library, http://www.lectlaw.com/files/att05.htm
(last visited May 10, 2016) (“The legal profession as we know it today barely
existed at that time. Lawyers were generally sole practitioners who trained
under a system of apprenticeship. There was no national code of ethics; there
was no national organization to serve as a forum for discussion of the
increasingly intricate issues involved in legal practice.”).
【28】American Bar Association, History of
the American Bar Association, http://www.americanbar.org/about_the_aba/history.html
(last visited May 10, 2016).
【30】Id. at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct.html
(last visited May 10, 2016).
【31】劉慶候、王冠仁,馬政府執政八年 司法信任度 溜滑梯探底,自由時報,2016年2月23日,http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/960769(最後瀏覽日:2016年6月9日)。
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